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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO FAIR USE:
AMENDING SECTION 107 TO AVOID THE "FARED USE" FALLACY
Wendy J. Gordon and Daniel Bahls*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Wrong Direction in Fair Use Scholarship and Jurisprudence

Under provocative titles like "Fared Use" 1 and "The End of Friction,"2
commentators argue about whether or not the copyright doctrine of fair use 3 should
exist in a world of instantaneous transactions. As collecting societies such as the
Copyright Clearance Center have become more powerful, and technologies like
cellular phones and the internet have made it possible to purchase digital copies by
dialing a number or clicking a mouse, the suggestion is sometimes made that fair

* © 2007 by Wendy J. Gordon and Daniel Bahls. Wendy Gordon is a Professor of
Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law at the Boston University School of Law. Daniel
Bahls is a 2007 magna cum Laude graduate of the Boston University School of Law and a
2004 graduate of Williams College. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at
the conference "Exploring the Boundaries of IP Law" at IDC Radzyner School of Law,
Herzliya, Israel, and we thank the participants there for their comments.
The authors also thank James Corwin, Carolyn Dekker, Tamar Frankel, Paul Geller,
Laura Heymann, Gavin McCormick, Brandy Karl, Gideon Parchomovsky, and especially
Pam Samuelson for helpful comments. We also want to express our appreciation to Raquel
Ortiz and the rest of the B.U. Law Library staff for their consistent willingness to go the
extra mile. For excellent research assistance, we thank Naomi Lee Baumol, Keren BenShahar, Jim Flahive, Shannon Liu Senn, and Andy Newsom. Responsibility for all errors
remains, of course, with us.
1 Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998).
2 Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130 (1997); see
also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV.
975 (2002). For a powerful presentation of the view that 'market failure' as a basis for fair
use should not be limited to barriers between seller and buyer, see Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission
Systems, 5 J. INIBLL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). For an interesting treatment that has some parallels
to the discussion in the instant article, see Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing
Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL.
L.REv. 1145, 1171 (2000). Other articles on the topic are cited as we raise various issues
below.
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use allows the unconsented use of a copyrighted work).
Developed as a judicial doctrine, fair use was eventually codified, although Congress gave
ample warnings in the legislative history that judges should continue to develop the
precedent and that the statute was not meant to "freeze the doctrine." H.R. REP. No. 941476, at 66 (1976).
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use could or should disappear. The Second and Sixth Circuits have flirted with
foreclosing fair use if a licensing market is present or possible. 4 The presence of
"traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets," they say, counts
heavily against fair use. 5 The only exception, a later decision suggests, might lie in
the ill-defined category of transformative uses. 6 For exact copies, it seems, the
presence of a licensing mechanism might be fatal to fair use. 7 This is a dangerous
direction for copyright law. 8

See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th
Cir. 1996) (where, although noting that "the existence of an established license fee system"
is "not conclusive," the court gave heavy weight to available licensing mechanisms); Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[l]t is not
unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become
legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use
is made easier.... [A]n unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a
ready market or means to pay for the use.").
On the dangers posed by this approach, see for example, James Gibson, Risk A version
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 931-35 (2007);
Loren, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing the ability of copyright owners to manipulate
licensing markets). See also Wendy J. Gordon, The 'Why' of Markets: Fair Use and
Circularity, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 371 (2007), http://yalelawjoumal.org/2007/4/25/
gordon.html (commenting on Gibson).
5 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 936. How heavily such markets should count is unclear. Some
observers see "the absence of market failure" as "the conclusive rationale for rulings
against fair use" in both Texaco and Michigan Documents. Ben Depoorter & Francesco
Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 453, 456 (2000).
6 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir.
2006) (resisting the notion that willingness to license will always count heavily against fair
use, but seeming to limit its new insight to cases of "transformative" uses). Admittedly the
Bill Graham Archives court gives an immensely broad reading to "transformative"-it
counts as "transformative" the exact but tiny replication of copyrighted concert posters in a
book about the Grateful Dead. Nevertheless, the Bill Graham Archives court does not go
far enough.
7 But see Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879-1903
(2007); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1862-71 & 1873-75
(2006) (discussing various kinds of exact copies that should qualify as fair uses).
8 Copyright law needs to make clear that any reproduction-whether or not it can be
seen as "transformative" --can potentially need and deserve fair use, despite the presence
of an owner willing to license.
On the importance that nontransformative speech can have, see for example, Rebecca
Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 546 (2004) (discussing the importance of exact replication).
See also Wendy J. Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language?
Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 127 (Paul
L.C. Torremans, ed., 2004) (considering a music historian's need to collect exact copies of
a song); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
4
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B. One Cause of the Wrong Direction

Contributing to this dangerous direction is a set of beliefs we dub the "fared
use fallacy." 9 "Fared use" is use for which a license is purchased, and the fallacy
can be defined by the following assumptions and conclusion:
Assumption one: Fair use exists to assist copyrighted works to be employed in
socially desirable ways that would not occur if the copyright owner's consent had
to be sought.
Assumption two: Any utilization of a copyrighted work that would generate
social or personal value will occur in an optimal way if the copyright owner and
the putative user are physically able to negotiate with each other in a setting where
transaction-cost barriers between them are low. That is, if a market is physically
available, imposing infringement liability on all copiers will not discourage
desirable use of copyrighted works.
Purported conclusion: Therefore, so long as a market can physically occur
between copyright claimant and those who wish to utilize the work, there is no
need for fair use. In other words, the argument runs: as technology makes more
licensing markets possible, fared use displaces fair use.
The easiest way 10 to see the flaws in the fallacy is by examining its second
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1591
(1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Self-Expression] ("Sometimes particular words are essential.").
9 We call the argument a "fallacy" only informally: The problem with the argument is
not its logical form (which would make it a formal fallacy) but with the truth of its
premises.
10 One can also dispute other aspects of the argument, including the first assumption.
Matthew Africa characterizes the first assumption somewhat differently than we do. He
attributes it to "the market failure theory of fair use" which he says "posits that the fair use
defense should protect only those uses for which a socially beneficial transfer of rights
would not occur absent a finding of fair use." Africa, supra note 2, at 1148.
A note from Professor Gordon: Although I might quarrel with aspects of Matthew
Africa's analysis of my work, I think his statement implicitly captures a difficulty in my
early thinking. I may have had the illusion that "a socially beneficial transfer of rights," id.,
existed as a static thing: that the valuable downstream use was a kind of Platonic entity
whose form and content would remain untouched by the process of obtaining permissions.
One change in my perspective is an increasing realization that process matters. That
is, I've come to appreciate more fully that the process of purchase can change the nature of
what the downstream artist produces. This theme is one I have explored in several articles,
see, for example, infra notes 22, 41 and 98), and that Daniel Bahls and I further explore
here, particularly in our discussion of privacy, see infra Part V.A.
There is often no fixed "use"-no final draft or disk securely hidden in a drawer-for
which permission is to be sought. (Copyright law can treat harshly those who make their
derivative works prior to obtaining permission.) A use-a parody, a quotation, an
adaptation-may have no existence except as a set of possibilities in a downstream artist's
future. To imagine that the artist's plans for using another's work will always remain
untouched by the process of purchasing permission is a flat absurdity when one considers
the complex nature of the creative process.
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step, namely, the claim that so long as a market exists, optimal use of copyrighted
works will occur. This claim may look plausible because it bears a superficial
resemblance to the Coase theorem. However, the Coase theorem functions only if
all transaction costs are absent, including the costs of monitoring all bargains 11 (a
matter which we address under privacy, below) and the costs that stand between
the market participants and third parties affected by the transaction. 12 An absence
of market barriers between copyright seller and licensee hardly assures the absence
of other transaction costs and other forms of market failure. And if such costs are
present, the law can and does make a difference in resource use. 13
Moreover, the Coase theorem never purports to claim that all socially
desirable uses will occur if transaction costs are absent; the theorem merely
addresses efficiency. 14 Even if the absence of transaction costs could automatically
ensure efficiency, justice and distributional equity will not automatically follow.
For these reasons, too, it will matter what the law does. Judges need to make
normative choices even where licensing is available.
The fared use fallacy accepts the notion that fair use is a legitimate response
to markets beset by imperfection, but assumes that the only way a market "fails" is
if the copyright claimant and the potential utilizer are blocked by transaction-cost
barriers from being able to identify, contact, and negotiate with each other. In other
words, under this misunderstanding, so long as some market exists-some forum
in which buying and selling can occur-the market is not "failing" and judges can
rely on private parties to spontaneously serve social ends.
The interpretation is sometimes erroneously attributed to an article that one of
us wrote in 1982. That article, Fair Use as Market Failure, 15 urged the courts to
confirm that fair use was an appropriate response to situations where, if copyright
were enforced over the contested usage, no licensing would occur and socially
valuable use would decrease. 16 In other words, the article argued that the fair use
doctrine embraced, inter alia, a user liberty to make exact copies when transactioncost barriers between user and copyright owner were so high that no licenses
would be likely to result even if the copyright were enforced. 17

Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (stating
that the costs of contracting include the costs of "undertak[ing] the inspection necessary to
be sure that the terms of the contract are being lived up to").
12 When a wide range of people are beneficially affected by a user's deployment of a
work, transaction costs may make those benefits "external" to the user's licensing decision.
For a discussion of the role that external benefits should play in fair use cases, see Loren,
supra note 2, at 53-56, and Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1630-31 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure].
13 See Coase, supra note 11, at 19.
14 Id. (placing "questions of equity apart").
15 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12.
16 See id. at 1620-21.
17 Id. at 1618.
11
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Such a "market barrier" rationale for fair use had been implicit in some earlier
cases, notably the 1973 case of Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 18 In 1982,
however, this implicit rationale had not yet been fully understood. For example, in
1981, a liberty to make exact home copies was repudiated by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, despite the apparent lack of any plausible route through which
such home copies could have been licensed. 19 Therefore, it was important at the
time to articulate that free use might appropriately be premised upon a consumer's
inability to purchase copies through any plausibly convenient mechanism. But that
1982 article never purported to displace the other justifications for fair use. (In
fact, the article canvassed a number of fair use types to show how they
corresponded to inadequacies of the market other than the inadequacy of
"transaction cost barriers that prevent licenses.")2° In short, the 1982 article sought
to secure a place for an additional fair use category, and show how economics
could illuminate a range of fair use types, not to truncate any of the many bases for
fair use.
Nevertheless, a more overweening market approach has proved attractive to
several commentators, who present transaction-cost barriers between cor yright
claimant and potential utilizer2 1 as if they were the sole basis for fair use. 2 Thus,
as the internet and other licensing mechanisms now proliferate, some argue that
fair use should correspondingly diminish. 23 We disagree. One category of fair use
does indeed become less necessary as transaction cost barriers diminish, but the
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), ajfd
per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
19 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-72 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
20 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1629-33 (discussing, inter
alia, externalities, nonmonetizable interests, and anti-dissemination motives).
21 Obviously, transaction costs play roles beyond setting up barriers between
copyright claimant and potential utilizer. Transaction costs are responsible for
"externalities," including the positive externalities generated by some users (like teachers,
students, and artists) who cannot capture in their pockets all the value they generate. When
such a user is the defendant, the positive externalities she generates provide another
possible basis for fair use. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at
1630-32; Loren, supra note 2, at 49-50. Our thanks go to Gideon Parchomovsky for
reminding us to make this explicit.
22 Exceptions exist, of course, including Lydia Loren's excellent article. See supra
note 2. For Gordon's own responses, see for example, Gordon, supra note 4; Wendy J.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always
Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 149-97 (2003) [hereinafter
Gordon, Excuse and Justification]; Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual
Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). Also, for
independent justifications for fair use, see for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as
Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 100-104 (1992)
[hereinafter Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use]; Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at
1555-60.
23 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 1, at 560-61.
18
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need for fair use to address a number of other public needs remains as strong as
ever.

C. Our Goals
In this Article, we suggest that the fair use provision, section 107, be amended
to read as follows (with our new language in italics):

§ 107. The right of fair use
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means [words omitted here], for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is a right and not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished or that a license is available for
the contested use shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all relevant factors.

Our primary suggestion appears in the last sentence of the proposed section
107. We suggest that Congress make emphatically clear that the availability of
licensing does not foreclose the possibility of fair use. In the process of arguing
that point, we will discuss some of the bases for triggering a fair use analysis that
exist independently of the presence of high transaction cost barriers between the
copyright claimant and the potential utilizer. 24
Secondarily, this Article suggests that the statute be amended to make clear
that fair use is an affirmative right. 25 This may seem unnecessary because the
24 A preliminary catalog appeared in Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note
12, at 1627-36 (presenting the following categories: market barriers, externalities,
nonmonetizable interests, noncommercial activities, and anti-dissemination motives).
25 Prior commentators have also urged the recognition of "user's rights" in various
contexts. See, notably, Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
"Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (analyzing First
Amendment basis for "right to read anonymously" and advocating congressional action to
mandate an anonymity option within digital copyright management systems); Jessica
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statute already specifies that fair uses are not an infringement of copyright, which
is equivalent to saying that fair uses are an area of liberty. In post-Hohfeldian
terms, where there is no infringement, the copyright owner has "no claim rights,"
and the public has correlative "liberties."26 So the public already has liberty rights
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 52-53 (1994)
(urging the reader to draft a model statute to safeguard, inter alia, user opportunities).
Richard Stallman, in a piece of dystopic science fiction, even imagined a revolution
premised in part on the desire to recapture for the people "the right to read." Richard
Stallman, The Right to Read, 40 COMM. ACM 85, 87, reprinted in FREE SOFrWARE, FREE
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 75, 77 (Joshua Gay ed., 2d ed.
2004), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html; see also Julie E.
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright I.aw, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 349 (2005)
[hereinafter Cohen, The Place of the User].
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly articulated fair use as a user's right.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. The Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13
(Can.). This case is discussed further infra note 148.
26 See WESLEY N. HOHFEID, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Yale
University Press 1923) [hereinafter HOHFELD, ESSAYS]; Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746-47 (1917)
[hereinafter Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning]. Conversely, the copyright owner has "claim
rights" in his areas of exclusivity, and in those domains the public has correlative "duties."
See HOHFELD, ESSAYS, supra; Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning, supra, at 746-47.
Our use of terms is post-Hohfeldian in two respects. First, instead of "right" as a label
for denominating the ability to call on the government for assistance, we prefer "claim
right." Second, instead of "privilege" as a label for denominating the freedom from
governmental control, we prefer "liberty."
To explain the first terminological change, from "right" to "claim right": the ability to
enlist governmental assistance is known in Hohfeld's system as a ''right." Recent
commentators tend to use the phrase "claim right" instead, and we follow that newer usage,
thus allowing us to preserve the simple term "right," with its rich connotative range, for
more general applicability.
As Hohfeld of course recognized, the term "right" standing alone has many meanings
in the law. For example, Hohfeld distinguishes "rights" from "powers" and "privileges,"
yet the Hohfeldian "power" to contract is often known as the "right" to contract, and the
Hohfeldian "privilege" of self-defense is often known as the "right" of self-defense.
Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning, supra, at 746-47. Therefore, we too will use the phrase
"claim right" (instead of the simple term "right") to denote the ability to enlist
governmental power.
Regarding the second terminological change, from "privilege" to "liberty," Hohfeld
used the term ''privilege" to denote an area where persons are free of governmental
restraint. Id. He had in mind privileges like self-defense, which immunized an actor from
ordinary tort liability. Id. More public-oriented privileges (like the freedom from
governmental restraint embodied in the First Amendment) were largely outside Hohfeld's
areas of doctrinal concern. Most of us would feel awkward calling something like free
speech a "privilege" since the word ''privilege" connotes something that is extra or
undeserved. We doubt Hohfeld intended his use of "privilege" to have such pejorative
connotations-we see "privilege" as simply the word that came to mind given his doctrinal

626

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 3

of fair use. But that a liberty right exists at one point in time is no guarantee of its
continuance, or that courts will give significant weight to the liberty right when its
exercise is imperiled by newly asserted legal claims. 27 This Article seeks to remind
the legal community that fair use is a "right" in all these senses: it is an existing
liberty, to which the public has an enduring entitlement, and which deserves
significant weight. These are all aspects of what the public usually means when
using the term "right."28 Therefore, having the statute explicitly label fair use a
"right" has advantages: the nomenclature would emphasize that the liberty of fair
use is an important entitlement under both our statutory scheme and our traditions.
Courts in the preemption area sometimes have trouble seeing that fair use is a
crucial part of the congressional balance.29 But fair use, of course, should play a
role in preemption cases-when analyzing whether federal copyright preempts a
contractual or other state law claim, the courts need to inquire into whether the
state law interferes with congressional policy.30 Yet courts sometimes construe
areas of noninfringement narrowly as if areas of nonprotection were mere

contexts. The word "liberty" is just as accurate as "privilege," and free of the negative
connotation.
"Privilege" also has another difficulty in the copyright context: historically, the term
"privilege" in England referred to governmental grants-such as a royal monopoly to sell
salt-that were awarded for reasons unrelated to creativity or invention. See, e.g., BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY 1217 (7th ed. 1999).
27 In addition, some commentators might object to terming fair use as a ''right" on
varying other grounds. See, e.g., the sources mentioned in Africa, supra note 2, at 24.
28 In this assessment of how "right" is understood colloquially, we are not following
the Dworkinian approach. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26, 193 (1977)
(presenting rights as "trumps" and "principles" as having "weight").
29 Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Will Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 237, 268 (2007) ("[C]ourts should be able to use a
preemption analysis to subjugate unfair license terms by determining that the fair use test
of copyright law trumps the license terms of an adhesion contract. However, recently there
has been a trend to uphold these adhesion contract terms.").
30 This is a debatable proposition, because some courts seem to see a mechanical
application of copyright's statutory preemption section, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), as
exhausting their preemption responsibilities. But other courts apply § 301 with an eye
toward congressional policy, and also recognize that congressional policy must be taken
into account even if§ 301 itself does not preempt. The latter inquiry is known as "conflict"
preemption. Thus Maureen O'Rourke writes:
Even if a particular [state] cause of action survives a§ 301 preemption analysis,
it still must be evaluated for consistency with constitutional concerns because it
still may be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract:
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479, 534 (1995) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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exceptions and without significant importance to the congressional scheme. 31 The
"rights" nomenclature may be of assistance here.
In addition, courts typically put the burden of proving fair use on the
defendant32 because under the current language, fair use can too easily be classified
as an "affirmative defense." Changes in the statutory language, such as we suggest,
will allow courts to make more sensitive, policy-based decisions not only on
preemption, but also on burden of proof. 33
We also suggest eliminating the first few words of the fair use provision,
which currently reference "the provisions of sections 106 and 106A."34 These
words, enacted prior to the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), can be
interpreted to exclude DMCA defendants from calling on fair use. 35 The statute
should not encourage a narrow reading of the fair doctrine's applicability to the
DMCA anticircumvention rules.
Our Article relegates our discussion of the DMCA issue to the footnotes. The
proposition that fair use should apply (or does apply) to the DMCA has been well
examined by others, 36 and raises some complexities beyond our current scope. 37
For an example, consider Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
Bette Midler filed a state cause of action when the makers of a television commercial had a
'sound-alike' singer imitate Midler's rendition of a particular song. The federal copyright
statute denies the owners of sound-recording copyrights the ability to sue imitators, 17
U.S.C. § 114(b), so one would have thought that copyright would have preempted Midler's
state cause of action. Nevertheless, although the Ninth Circuit recognized the existence of
the federal statute, the court gave the provision little attention and held the singer's state
cause of action not preempted. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
32 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema
Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
33 See, e.g., Africa, supra note 2, at 1171 (suggesting "shifting the burden of proof to
the plaintiff on the market effect factor" but also that "it would probably require a
legislative amendment to the statute to effect this change"); Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure, supra note 12, at 1624-26 (suggesting that once defendant proves market failure,
"[t]he burden of going forward with proof of injury should then shift to plaintiff').
34 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2006).
35 Although some judicial language can be interpreted to suggest that fair use would
not apply in any DMCA action, at least one court has expressly left that question open. See
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381F.3d1178, 1199 & n. 14 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (discussing and distinguishing prior caselaw). See also id. at 1212 (''The statutory
structure and the legislative history both make it clear that the DMCA granted copyiight
holders additional legal protections, but neither rescinded the basic bargain granting the
public noninfringing and fair uses of copyrighted materials, § 120l(c), nor prohibited
various beneficial uses of circumvention technology, such as those exempted under §§
1201 (d),(t),(g),(j). ").
Changing the language in section 107 could encourage experimentation to square fair
use policies with anticircumvention policies. See e.g., infra note 37.
36 Major sources are collected in Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest
Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming
31
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Our focus is on two propositions: that "fared use" cannot displace all of fair
use, and that fair use is a "right." These propositions are already true, already
implicit in the statute, but need to be made explicit.
D. Roadmap

Our Article will begin by stipulating a definition for "market failure" as a
triggering event for a judge to stop giving automatic deference to a copyright
claimant. The Article then reaches into the core of Law and Economics and utilizes
Ronald Coase' s classic notion of "reciprocal cause" to illuminate a crucial reason
why all benefits should not be internalized to copyright owners. The Article then
posits two potential fair users, one ·fully imaginary and one drawn from Bob
Dylan's autobiography. We examine how these two people might fare under bases
for fair use other than transaction-cost barriers between them and the copyright
claimants. We first canvass categories of fair use already found in the case law or
literature, and then offer two additional ways in which requiring purchase of a
license-even if some licensing could occur sans transaction-cost barriers between
the participants-might fail to serve social interests. The Article then addresses the
terminological problem-fair use as a "right." Our Article concludes by returning
to the amendments that we suggest Congress add to the Copyright Act to help
courts safeguard the fair use doctrine.
Remember, a finding of market failure does not mean that the defendant
should win. It only means that we cannot automatically trust the copyright
claimant's judgment and that the judge's usual rigid deference to the copyright
owner should give way to a more flexible inquiry into the merits-particularly
when it is not certain that the owner's claim rightfully extends to the disputed
use. 38

2007) (manuscript at 3 n.15), available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers.
html (follow the title hyperlink).
37 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 54-70 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection: Technological Protection
Measures and Section 1201 of the US Copyright Act, 10, 12-17 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 07137, 2007), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/index.html (follow "Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working
Papers," then the title); Reichman et al., supra note 36, at 41-46.
38 We are indebted here to Abraham Drassinower's notion of copyright's intrinsic
limits. See Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of
Copyright vis-ii-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb.
2008).
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WHY MARKETS CAN BE USEFUL-AND WHEN THEY ARE NOT

A. What We Mean by "Market Failure"

For our purposes, a market fails whenever we cannot trust it as an allocator of
social resources. The failure could be a technical failure, such as one arising out of
the presence of transaction costs, strategic behavior, 39 or income and endowment
effects.40 Or the failure can be a larger matter, such as the inappropriateness of
using market transactions in a given context. A comparative institutional analysis
can show that, at least in some contexts, markets are a less appropriate way of
encouraging creativity and dissemination than are alternative modes, such as
informal norms of reciprocity or gift.41 In short, although economists use "market
failure" in a narrower sense than that adopted here, we will employ the term to
identify any characteristics that would erode the conditions under which the
market's "invisible hand" will automatically direct resources as society would
prefer.
B. When Markets Are Useful

Note that we emphasize the market's failure to "automatically" function in a
desirable way. This issue is one of appropriate delegation. As Morris Cohen
pointed out, property is an area where the government delegates some of its
decision-making power--cedes some of its sovereignty-to the owner, a private
party.42
"Delegation of sovereignty" means that owners' decisions are automatically
enforced, without judicial second-guessing. Such delegation of sovereigntydeference to property owners--can serve efficiency because often private parties
can employ local information to make decisions about resource use that serve not
only their private interests but also the public interest in having resources valuably
employed. In essence, when the market is working properly, private actors do a
better, less-costly job of distributing resources than a typical government regulator
can. The government can step back and allow property owners to do their private
balancing of costs and benefits through decisions to buy, sell, and license, so long
39

Some commentators would consider strategic behavior a kind of transaction cost.

See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 82 (1994) ("[T]he Coase Theorem overlooks
stratefiic behavior itself as an important transaction cost.").
0 See infra notes 99-100.
41 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTII OF NETWORKS, How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOMS (2006); LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT:
IMAGINATION AND TIIE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Render
Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004)
[hereinafter Gordon, Caesar].
42 See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927).
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as the market structure is serving the public interest. When market structures
cannot be relied upon to promote social goals, however, this justification for the
delegation of sovereignty also fails. The government then typically steps in to
reassert its sovereignty, and has one of its agents (for example, a judge) weigh the
costs, benefits, and justice of the disputed action.

C. When We Cannot Trust the Invisible Hand, We Look More Closely
Thus, as we catalog some of the many places where markets are inadequate,
we are also cataloging reasons why automatic deference to owners' wishes-that
is, delegating sovereignty to owners-is inappropriate. As was emphasized earlier,
lack of deference to a rights holder's private decision-making is not the same thing
as saying the defendant should always win. Rather, it means that a decision-maker
other than the property owner should judge whether the public interest is best
served by enforcing, or not enforcing, the copyright. The presence of market
failure, therefore, does not trigger the grant of fair use to a defendant. It triggers a
judicial examination of the merits. 43
In the language of the common law, the presence of market failure essentially
transforms a "trespass" inquiry into a "reasonableness" inquiry. Thus, for example,
when two drivers accidentally collide in the tangible world, their lack of intention
triggers a judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of their behavior.44
Reasonableness requires a decision by judge or jury as to the normative merits of
the parties' behavior.
In copyright, a quasi-reasonableness inquiry can be triggered by factors that
are far subtler than a lack of intentionality. This should not surprise us. The
copyright market is itself a compromise institutional solution. Plagued by
deadweight loss, copyright markets are incapable of "perfection." Moreover, if a
copyright owner makes the wrong decision, the stakes are particularly high given

43 The merits include both the value of the contested use, and the appropriateness of
defendant's decision to bypass the market. See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra
note 22.
Note that fair use may involve judges in making some decisions that go beyond the
standard Bleistein vision of judicial neutrality on aesthetic matters. Compare Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.") with
Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody
Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 305, 312 (1993) ("[D]octrines of copyrightabilitynotably the requirements for registration and 'originality' -have developed with an eye
towards value neutrality. It seems impossible to remain neutral in the same sense when
assessing whether a work is 'really' a parody .... "); see also Alfred Chuh-Yih Yen,
Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). Addressing this
issue would take us beyond the scope of the current Article.
44 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1127 (1972).
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that free speech and democratic participation can be at risk. 45 Additionally, unlike
a stranger's unconsented consumption of an owner's scarce tangible property, a
stranger's unconsented use of a copyrighted work might not cause harm to the
owner.
Moreover, the delegation (deference to owners) that one sees in the tangible
realm should not be overstated. Nuisance law, for example, is often governed by
reasonableness inquiries, even when the actors behave intentionally.46 In the realm
of tangibles, when problems that afflict copyright arise-such as holdouts and
other strategic behavior-the law typically responds with a lack of deference, and
judges reassert the sovereignty of the government as the decision-maker. 47
Penalver and Katyal even argue that while a "delegation" architecture is
characteristic of tangible property, an "anti-delegation" architecture is
characteristic of copyright. 48 So it is no wonder that, as compared with the yes/no
questions presented by trespass claims over realty ("Did the defendant cross the
boundary or did he not?"), fair use and cognate doctrines require copyright judges
to engage in nuanced decisions that assess, on a virtually all-things-considered
basis, whether the defendant has appropriately bypassed the market.
D. Recap
An owner's unwillingness or inability to license can trigger fair use,49 but the

converse does not follow. The copyright owner's willingness to license a particular
use does not necessarily mean that the copyright owner has a right to control that
use. Even if an owner is willing to license, the law may give him no claim right to
demand a license. On the contrary, the putative user of the copyright work may
have a fair use entitlement.
There are many places where, despite the potential for licensing, our society
cannot afford to rely on an owner's self-interest to further the public interest. The
copyright statute should make this even clearer than it already does. 50

See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 948-49 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283, 285, 352 (1996); and the additional sources cited infra note 63.
46 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821B (1979).
47 Holding out and other strategic behaviors motivate takings law-that is, the
government's freedom to take property with compensation, but against the owner's will.
48 Fair use is only one of the "anti-delegation" characteristics they see in coyright law.
See SONIA KATYAL & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, PROPERTY 0UTI.AWS II: FREE(DOM)
RIDING IN TIIE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (forthcoming 2008) ("delegation"
architecture can be defined as a system of law which "delegates a variety of key
gatekeeping function to the owner").
49 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1628-30, 1632-35
(discussing anti-dissemination motives and transaction-cost barriers).
50 We believe our suggested change in language is not necessary to give proper scope
to the fair use doctrine. The language would largely serve as a reminder, making it easier
45
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In this Article, we shall briefly recapitulate some of the well known (and not
so well known) categories upon which commentators or courts have suggested fair
use can be premised. Then we explore two considerations in depth. One, privacy,
has been mentioned in the literature before, but needs further development; the
second, 'packaging,' seems not to have been previously examined in the fair use
context. All of the fair use categories are consistent with three recognitions:

1.
2.
3.

That copyright law employs the devices of property rights and
markets to accomplish certain goals.
That certain identifiable characteristics can, when they appear in
specific cases, make markets less likely to accomplish these goals.
That the presence of high transaction costs impeding bargains
between copyright claimant and potential utilizer is only one of
many such characteristics.

Ill. "DOWNSTREAM" AUTHORS AS EFFICIENT DECISION-MAKERS

The fundamental reason why broad fair use is crucial to both economic health
and cultural flourishing can be seen in one of the articles that gave birth to the Law
and Economics movement: The Problem of Social Cost by Ronald Coase. 51 In that
article, Coase criticized the Pigovian notion that all costs of a polluting activity
should automatically be borne by the factory. 52 Sometimes a factory can make a
cost-effective reduction in pollution, either by adopting filters or by reducing
overall production, but sometimes it cannot; sometimes the downstream neighbors
could avoid the pollution more easily and cheaply, perhaps, for example, by
hooking up to the city water system instead of washing their clothes in the river.
To restate the Coasian lesson, taking it from the context of land-based
nuisances like pollution, and adapting it to the new context of copyright law: Do
not assume that the most obvious active party (the copyright owner) is the one to
whom all the effects should be intemalized.53 Sometimes the downstream author or
user is in a position to take value-enhancing steps, and she needs incentives to do
for future judges to avoid the occasional errors of some past decisions that improperly
limited fair use. But see supra note 33 (regarding burdens of proof).
51 Coase, supra note 11.
52 Id. at 12-17. Coase's ''theory of the firm" also has profound implications for
copyright. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 40--47 (1988).
Using Coase's theory of the firm, Yochai Benkler argues for decentralized modes of social
production. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE. L.J. 369, 375-76 (2002). The classic statement of the opposing stance-arguing
that many intellectual products require centralization rather than decentralization-is
Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
285-86 (1977).
53 See Wendy J. Gordon, Ronald Coase, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW
(P. Cane & J.A.F. Conaghan, eds., forthcoming 2008).
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so. 54 Therefore, some privileges should be left to that downstream person; the law
should allow the downstream person to keep some of the benefits, so that she will
have incentive to take productive steps herself.
Comparing the incentives for upstream and downstream actors yields one of
the reasons copyrights expire. Consider the impact if Shakespeare's multitudinous
descendants owned copyright in the plays. How would it have complicated efforts
to mount West Side Story if Shakespeare's heirs had been able to capture much of
the profit because of the play's obvious use of plot sequences from Romeo and
Juliet? And what of Jane Smiley's best-selling novel, A Thousand Acres? In that
book, for which she received a Pulitzer Prize, Smiley interprets King Lear in a way
sympathetic to the ungrateful daughters: the father has indulged in sexual abuse.
Conceivably, Shakespeare's heirs might have tried to suppress Smiley's novel. 55
And for what purpose would society give heirs such power? It is hard to imagine
that the prospect of his family having infinite control over his works would have
provided Shakespeare appreciable incentives. 56
The need to allow productivity to flower in non-centralized hands is not only
served by the durational limit; it is also one of the prime reasons for the fair use
doctrine. It would be a serious error to allow all benefits to be internalized by the
copyright owner. 57
Copyright law imposes a loss of liberty with consequences that monetary
payments may not satisfy. Creative production may need a kind of freedom
inconsistent with the bureaucratic record keeping that licensing requires. 58 The
possibility of merely a monetary surplus may not be sufficient to encourage the
kind of spontaneous play59 among second-generation creators that we need. 60
54 See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Hanns,"
"Benefits," and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 535, 537
(2003).
55 See, e.g., Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of
Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), available at http://www.baen.com/library/palaver4.htm
(discussing the possibility that James Boswell's descendants might have refused to allow
republication of the Life of Johnson).
56 In fact, the issue of duration did not arise at all; Shakespeare's life predated the first
English copyright statute.
57 For some of the additional reasons why it is unwise to internalize all benefits to one
party, see for example, William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (2000) (discussing Glynn
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 V AND. L. REV. 483
(1996)), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf. Also, as
Landes and Posner point out, every increase in this generation's copyright increases the
cost of creating for the next generation, who must use what came before. William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 334 (1989).
58 The need to obtain advance permission may "distort the borrower's creative
impulse." Gordon, Caesar, supra note 41, at 82; see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 372-73.
59 On the importance of play, see, for example, David Lange, Reimagining the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 481 n.63 (2003); David Lange, At Play in the
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Also note that many forms of incentives and remuneration are possible.61 In
emphasizing the need for downstream liberty-and the need for downstreamers to
keep some of the benefits they generate-we hardly gainsay that authors need
money to live. The question is not "money or freedom," but rather, what
institutional schemes give us the best possible mixture of monetary incentives to
create, and the liberty needed to create. 62 Fair use, a tool for allowing flexibility
within the dominant market model, is an essential part of the institutional arsenal.

IV. A PAIR OF HYPOTHETICALS AND A CATALOG OF FAIR USE TYPES
We proffer two potential fair users-a songwriter named Dylan and a scholar
named Janine-and will refer back to their situations as we review various fair use
rationales. As for the set of categories against which we will measure the potential
fair users, it is best to begin with the Supreme Court's reminder that fair use has a
constitutional dimension that sounds in free speech: 63 Fair use constitutes one of
the Copyright Act's ''traditional First Amendment safeguards."64

Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate
Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 139, 146-50 (1992); David Lange, Recognizing
the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 147, 175-76 (1981). (Although this is a
painfully unplayful footnote.)
60 For discussion of how bureaucratic and monetary constraints can inhibit the muse,
see, for example, HYDE, supra note 41, at 5.
61 See Benkler, supra note 41, at 376, 433-35; Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84
HARV. L. REV. 281, 324-26 (1970).
62 Even the monetary issue leads to limiting copyright. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 57, at 331-33. Securing monetary returns via copyright ownership increases
incentives to one generation, but increasing those returns raises the costs of the next
generation of creative persons too much. Id. In Strahlivetz's witty words, this "introduce[s]
a useful sort of Laffer curve to the analysis of innovation policy." Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Wealth Without Markets, 117 YALEL.J. 1472, 1481 (2007) (reviewing Benkler, who made
a point similar to Landes & Posner's). A better (if less witty) analogy than the "Laffer
curve" might be Guido Calabresi's search for a system that minimizes the costs of
accidents: as Calabresi emphasized, reducing one kind of cost (e.g., discouraging fast
driving) often increases other kinds of costs (such as enforcement costs and pedestrian
carelessness}, so the search is for a method of calibrating the interrelated cost-benefit
functions to generate the highest net result. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS passim (1970).
63 The literature exploring the relation between the First Amendment and fair use is
rich. See, e.g., Balcer, supra note 45; David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 463 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALEL.J. 1 (2002).
64 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act against constitutional challenge).
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Thus, the Court views fair use as a "First Amendment accommodation[]" that
is "built-in"65 to the Copyright Act and helps preserve copyright's constitutionality. 66
Although it is conceivable that in some cases the availability of licenses can satisfy
First Amendment concerns, 67 this might not often be the case. When monetary
markets cannot accommodate free speech interests, fair use must be available
despite the presence of licensing markets.
Fair use does not only render service where copyright claims threaten First
Amendment goals. Other situations may be mishandled unless fair use is available.
Of those already in the literature, we will discuss: patterns of creative production
that are not consistent with bureaucratic behaviors; anticommons, hold-out and
bilateral monopoly problems; distributional inequities; positive externalities; use of
another's work not as expression but as a fact; use of another's expression as a
means to access the public domain; and critical, nonmonetizable and/or "priceless"
uses of copyrighted works. We also present two additional purposes that fair use
may serve despite the availability of licensing: preserving an expectation of
privacy and encouraging the development of efficient rights packaging.
This list is not exhaustive. Some additional forms of fair use (such as using
another's copyrighted work in self-defense)68 do not adapt well to our
hypotheticals. But the many examples we do canvass should more than
demonstrate that the mere possibility of licensing does not satisfy all the
constitutional, social, and moral needs to which fair use responds. 69

Id.
The copyright provisions challenged in Eldred were upheld in part because the
Court felt confident that fair use could serve First Amendment goals: "[W]hen, as in this
case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary." Id. at 221
67 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the availability of licensing
constituted part (but not all) of the basis on which the Supreme Court upheld a state right of
publicity claim against constitutional challenge. 433 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1977). The Court
stated:
65

66

[l]n 'right of publicity' cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing.
An entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit of such
publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner did not seek to enjoin the
broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the broadcast in the
form of damages.
Id.

See sources discussed infra note 141.
Our strategy is not unique. For example, Mathew Africa and Lydia Loren give
examples of situations where fair use is needed despite a possibility of licensing. Africa,
supra note 2 at 1167 (discussing markets for criticism); Loren, supra note 2, at 47-57
(identifying "societal benefits [that] are impossible to internalize in any bargained-for
exchange between the copyright owner and the user".)
68
69
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Now let us turn to the two potential fair users and their situations. The first
situation is based on an event in the life of Bob Dylan.
A. Bob Dylan Studies a Song

Bob Dylan recounts how he took some of his early steps toward becoming a
songwriter. Fascinated by the Brecht/Weill composition "Pirate Jenny," 70
I found myself taking the song apart, trying to find out what made it
tick. ... I took the song apart and unzipped it-it was the form, the free
verse association, the structure and disregard for the known certainty of
melodic patterns to make it seriously matter, give it its cutting edge. It
also had the ideal chorus for the lyrics. I wanted to figure out how to
manipulate and control this particular structure and form which I knew
was the key that gave "Pirate Jenny" its resilience and outrageous
power. 71
Let us assume that Dylan wrote down the complete lyrics and musical score. Few
of us would think Dylan would have violated copyright in making these copies by
hand. 72
Would our answer change if there were a website where potential songwriters
who wanted to hand-copy lyrics or music could purchase a license to do so?

70

"Pirate Jenny" is a famously bitter song by Brecht and Weill. Written in the 1920s,
and encountered by Dylan decades later, the song for Dylan was a new kind of experience
that opened up a range of creative possibilities previously unglimpsed. See BOB DYLAN,
CHRONICLES: VOLUME ONE 273-76 (1971).
What we assume Dylan did-writing down someone else's text word for word-is
neither unusual nor trivial. At least one English department regards as a "secret bible" the
1920 book by Robert Gay, Writing Through Reading. Gay urges the rewriting of others'
prose as one of the best methods for students to learn to write and read well. ROBERT M.
GAY, WRITING THROUGH READING xvii (1920) ("Reproducing thought which you read has
several definite advantages over original composition."). For some uses of Gay's work in
the classroom, see, for example, http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/4/79.04.
01.x.html.
71 DYLAN, supra note 70, at 275-76.
72 But see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[E][4][d] (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (explaining that there are no
reported cases determining "whether a single handwritten copy of all or substantially all of
a book or other protected work made for the copier's own private use is an infringement or
fair use" and arguing that although "force of custom might impel a court to rule for the
defendant on the ground of fair use," that result "could not be reconciled with the rationale
for fair use").

1,

I
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B. Janine Studies Aristotle
Our second, more ornate example comes from our imaginations, though we
think it plausible. We posit a young scholar named Janine. Janine is preparing an
essay on Aristotle's Poetics. 73 Although she can not read Greek-she only
understands French and English-Janine does not want to be overly influenced by
any one translator's interpretation of Aristotle. To the contrary, she wants to be in a
position where she can comment intelligently on the various translations that are
currently influential in her field.
As an initial stage in her research, she plans to make a chart showing
alternative translations for every Greek paragraph. Accordingly, she pays for and
downloads the major translations of the Poetics that exist in English and French, in
electronic versions. 74 One translation, we shall assume, is in the public domain
because its copyright has expired. The copyrights in the other translations, we shall
assume, have not expired.
After Janine downloads the electronic books she reads each of them, at least
in part, many times. She then uses the copy function to paste the full text of each
into her word processor. In the process she loses the formatting and page numbers
that had been in the uneditable version, but she does not mind. She can now move
the English and French texts around, highlight what she needs to highlight, and
insert comments as she thinks of things to include in her essay.
She then copies the relevant portions of the many translations into a master
chart, making sure to match up the varying translations in French or English with
the corresponding Greek paragraph to the extent possible. Finally, she begins to

We chose Poetics with malice aforethought. Our topic is the utility of copying, and
Aristotle emphasized that copying and imitation ("mimesis") was foundational to all art.
ARISTOTLE, POETICS, ch. 4, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2316,
2318 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Ingram Bywater trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) ("Imitation
is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this,
that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation.").
74 When we mention the purchase of intellectual products sold for computers, we
stumble into the area of things putatively controlled by various licensing agreements.
Leaving the technicalities of contract formation aside, such as whether a click-wrap,
browse-wrap, or a vaguely-co-exist-wrap license is properly accepted, we meet questions
of how broadly copyright preemption should be applied. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). We
later touch on the possibility that Janine has contracted away some of her fair use rights,
but do so only briefly, infra note 122 and accompanying text. While we believe that fair
use can play a role if copyright owners tried to limit Janine's rights by contract, fully
exploring this role would take us outside the scope of this Article.
For the moment, let us set aside the issue of whether contract or copyright should
control in Janine's case. Instead, we can focus on the following questions. Assuming that
no contract controls a particular use (whether from failure to form a contract, failure to
plead a contract-based cause of action, silence of an otherwise controlling contract on a
particular issue, copyright preemption, or any other reason) what are the respective rights
and privileges of the parties?
73
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write her essay, including in it many (duly-cited) lengthy quotations from the
translations.
None of Janine's actions, at first glance, seem at all unethical or unfair. As for
lawfulness, clearly she is behaving lawfully when she copies into her word
processor the translation whose copyright has expired, and quotes from it.
However, the copyright law gives the copyright owners of the other translations an
exclusive right of reproduction75 and of making derivative works. 76 Copyright law
might or might not prohibit her from moving the text into a word processor, from
creating her chart of differences, from quoting from the translations she
discusses, 77 and possibly even from rereading the books too many times. 78 She is
making unlicensed79 reproductions of, and unlicensed derivative works from,
copyrighted works. 80
17 U.S.C. § 106(1) gives copyright owners an exclusive right to copy. Moving a
text to a word processor literally, if not in spirit, implicates this right, even if Janine
destroys the original digital version and simply substitutes the new platform for it. First a
copy is made in RAM, which many courts consider making a copy (despite legislative
history to the contrary), and then she makes a copy to her hard disk. On the "right to read,"
we are indebted to the work of Jessica Litman and Richard Stallman. See supra note 25;
infra text accompanying note 146.
76 17 u.s.c. § 106(2).
77 Scholarly quotation is well recognized as a fair use. Our angle of inquiry asks
whether this well-recognized liberty should vanish if copyright owners stood ready to
license it.
78 Some commentators see an "exclusive right over reading" arising out of the
conjunction of the reproduction right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), with a few court cases such as
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991F.2d511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993), which have
viewed making a copy into RAM (which a computer must do every time it reads a file) to
be sufficiently nontransitory to constitute "copying" under § 106. Thus, even if Janine
owns a digital copy of a book, it might constitute civil copyright infringement for her to
reread it. See generally Litman, supra note 25 (discussing copyright issues raised during
use of the Internet). Additionally, the "one read" license might not be terribly far away.
Microsoft's Zune music player allows users to send songs from one Zune to another, which
can then be sampled "up to three times in three days." Zune to Zune Sharing,
http://www.zune.net/en-us/meetzune/zunetozunesharing.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007).
We can assume that each digital copy Janine downloads comes bundled with an implicit or
explicit license to read it at least once-and probably more than once--otherwise nobody
would buy it. See Yannis Bakos, Eric Brynjolfsson & Douglas Lichtman, Shared
Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 142-44 (1999). However, if one book is licensed
to be read five times (and to minimize the contract preemption issue mentioned in note 74,
contains no provision expressly limiting Janine to reading it only five times) would a sixth
reading violate the copyright law?
79 Note that the word "unlicensed" in this context does not mean illegal or
unpermitted. It merely means that the copies would not be made with the permission of the
copyright holder. This Article investigates whether Janine needs the permission of the
copyri§ht holder.
8 If not for the fair use doctrine, copying and pasting would be a violation of the
copyright owner's reproduction right. 17 USC§§ 106(1), 107. In addition, Janine will soon
75
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Is Janine's behavior an infringement of copyright or is it instead lawful as a
"fair use"?81 Should the answer change if the electronic book publisher is willing
to sell Janine a license82 to make additional copies and derivative works?83 Must
Janine pay these license fees, or is the publisher simply trying to sell her rights she
already has?

C. How Our Hypotheticals Fare
In our hypotheticals, transaction cost barriers between the copyright claimant
and potential utilizer are low. 84 Nevertheless, both utilizers-Bob Dylan and

be making a derivative work from each of those translations as she makes her comparative
charts and inserts her various comments and changes. Id. § 106(2). Making derivative
works is another behavior that the law appears to place within the copyright owner's
exclusive ken. Id. If not for the fair use doctrine, this would be a violation of the copyright
owner's right to make derivative works. Id.
81 At least one court has indicated, in dicta, that some of these behaviors are fair uses.
In a DMCA case, the court observed: ''The conversion accomplished by the [contested]
program enables a purchaser of an ebook to engage in 'fair use' of an ebook without
infringing the copyright laws, for example, by allowing the lawful owner of an ebook to
read it on another computer, to make a back-up copy, or to print the ebook in paper form."
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1118-19 (N.D.Cal. 2002). The Elcom
court then went on to note that "[t]he same technology, however, also allows a user to
engage in copyright infringement," id. at 1119, and upheld an indictment under the DMCA
that alleged ''trafficking in and marketing of' the program, id., against motions to dismiss
that had raised constitutional challenges to the DMCA.
82 Suppose, for example, Janine copied the text of the first three books without any
difficulties, but a window popped up when she attempted to copy the text of the final book.
The window read: "Do you want to do more than read the PDF version you have
purchased? If so, additional charges apply. The publisher has reserved its exclusive rights,
including the right to make copies and derivative works. If your copy is exclusively for
personal use, the publisher is willing to sell you a license to make additional copies for
$1.50 per page. You may enter a credit card number below."
The blurb in the window continued: "For derivative works recasting or transforming
our copyrighted work, the price for each page used by you is $2.50, plus ten per cent of
your gross revenues. For the preparation of derivative works, in addition to entering your
credit card, enter the name of your project and the person in your enterprise capable of
receiving service of process. We will contact that person once every three months to obtain
progress reports and a statement of your gross revenues, if any."
83 We might also ask about access restraints: if Janine's software prevents her from
accessing this copy, is it unfair or illegal for her to find some kind of technological workaround in order to get a text she can edit? If she modifies the access-control file, she may
violate the DMCA's anticircumvention rule. See id. § 1201(a)(l)(A) ("No person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under this title."). But see supra notes 35-37.
84 Admittedly, in our later discussion, the possibility arises that Janine may find all of
her digital books accompanied by confusing licensing terms. This raises the possibility of a
new kind of transaction cost barrier: the time and frustration for Janine having to decipher
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Janine-have good claims to fair use. 85 First we will mention some bases for their
fair use claims already found in the literature, and then advance two additional
bases for fair use: encouraging the development of efficient rights packaging and
preserving an expectation of privacy. Note that all these bases for fair use can be
characterized as forms of market failure other than the presence of transaction-cost
barriers between copyright claimant and utilizer.
Let us start by canvassing bases already recognized in the literature. First,
regarding Dylan, the bureaucratic process of obtaining permission is likely to chill
creative experimentation. 86 That means that the market may not be a good
institution to employ here, and that instead the courts should allow a formal liberty,
one regulated only by informal norms such as cooperative reciprocity or generative
gratitude among artists.
Second, if Janine wants to do a truly scholarly job, she needs to make
reference to all the respected translators. This gives any one of them a potential
hold-out power. Analogous to an anticommons problem, holdout and bilateral
monopoly problems are potentially powerful bases for fair use. 87
Third, both Janine and the young Dylan are unlikely to have in their pockets
money reflecting the ability of their use to serve social welfare. Both on
distributional grounds, 88 and on the ground that they are generators of positive
externalities, 89 they may have claims to fair use.
Fourth, the translations are "facts of life" in Janine's field, and her essay
would not be complete without extensive quotation and analysis of the leading
authorities. She should be shielded in her efforts to use facts, even when the facts
are manmade. 90

such licenses--or the cost of uncertainty if she clicks assent without reading. Reading
notices is something for which very few consumers have time. It strains cognitive and
attentional abilities. Cf. Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1206-57 (1994) (discussing warnings and notices in
the product liability arena).
85 In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, Dylan and Janine's activities are not
likely to harm the expected, normal markets of the songwriters and translators, or their
assignees. But since we are trying to break the circularity of the "licensing analysis," we
will leave that out of the equation for now. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 371-76.
86 Gordon, Caesar, supra note 41, at 89; see also Cohen, The Place of the User, supra
note 25, at 371 (making the same point).
87 On strategic behavior as a source for fair use, see Merges, supra note 2, at 133
(noting that strategic behavior includes bilateral monopoly); Ben Depoorter & Francesco
Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 453, 458-59 (2002) (discussing holdout and anticommons problems).
88 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1535, 1539-40 (2005).
89 See Loren, supra note 2, at 49-50; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note
12, at 1630.
90 See Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use, supra note 22, at 93-94.
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As a matter of subject-matter classification, facts are not ownable under
copyright, while expressive texts can be owned.91 But the same text can have
different ontologies. What is communication of truth in one context, can in another
context be a mere fact about what was stated. This is something that evidence law
recognizes: it outlaws as hearsay only those third-party statements that are
presented to prove ''the truth of the matter asserted." When third-party statements
are presented for the purpose of proving other facts, evidence law treats them as
nonhearsay.
The fair use doctrine thus serves to honor the public interest in access to texts
when they are acting not as communicators but as facts. When someone replicates
a text that is ordinarily expressive not (or not solely) for its original
communicative message, but rather to show that the text exists and to examine its
impact, the fair use doctrine should be available to handle the crucial shift in the
text's ontological nature. 92
And fair use does often serve this function. A newspaper was sheltered by fair
use when it printed a copyrighted photo that lay at the center of a controversy,93
and a litigant is generally sheltered by fair use when she makes copies of
copyrighted documents whose content is factually at issue in the litigation.94
Fifth, Janine is essentially seeking to understand an artifact of Western
culture, the public domain text by Aristotle. She is like a programmer seeking to
understand the public domain ideas within a copyrighted program: if the only
practical way to gain access to the public domain is to copy, Baker v. Selden95 and
the reverse engineering cases teach us that the person seeking a public-domain use
91

92

17 u.s.c. § 102.
This summarizes the argument made in Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use, supra note

22.

See Nufiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000).
See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 72, at § 13.05[0][2]. This can
extend to computer code. Tavory v. NPT, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538-39 (E.D. Va.
2007) ("[T]he character of the use was not commercial, nor was the potential market for or
value of the software source code impaired. To the extent that the code was reproduced in
anticipation of or preparation for litigation, that use was a fair use and there can be no
liability for infringement."). The court continued in a footnote:
93

94

The Plaintiff has cited authority for the proposition that the use of
copyrighted material in the course of litigation may fall outside the ambit of fair
use, and thus expose the party who uses the copyrighted material to liability for
infringement. . . . The Court does not presume to announce a rule that
categorically shields litigants from copyright liability through fair use. But
where, as here, the works produced before the Court are material to the
litigation, and where the party offering production of the work has done so
without notice or knowledge of another's claim to copyright, the equities are in
favor of fair use.

Id. at 539 n.10 (citation omitted).
95 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879).
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might be able to employ others' copyrighted expression. 96 A liberty like the one
allowed for purposes of reverse engineering in search of uncopyrightable ideas
should be given, in at least some contexts, to a search for the meaning of public
domain texts. 97
Sixth, Janine will be discussing some of the copyrighted translations
critically. This obviously implicates nonmonetizable interests such as free speech.
Further, the sale of "rights to criticize" could degrade the quality of criticism. 98
Moreover, permission to be criticized is a "product" that bears a high emotional
charge, and we suspect that such goods are particularly sensitive to income and
endowment effects. 99 This is most visible at the extreme: someone who possesses
the right not to be criticized might not sell it at any price ... but if he had to
purchase the critic's silence, the price he could pay would be limited by his
financial resources. 100 In such a situation, there is no neutral market that can reveal
which use-the critical use or the silence-is more valuable. 101
See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding fair use for reverse engineering); Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that intermediate copying that was necessary to
access unprotected functional elements constituted fair use). The law of real property
similarly creates rights to enter private land in order to reach public areas. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Keynote, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened, 55 CASE WES1ERN U. L. REV. 903, 907
(2005).
97 Of course, there are additional complications to be investigated. Among other
things, Janine has at least one public domain translation she can use, and she cannot call on
the patent policies that probably assisted the defendant's reverse-engineering cases.
98 See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Commodification and Market Perspectives, reprinted in THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION 149, 194 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., 2002) (making
analogy to Titmuss's argument regarding the way that selling blood decreased the quality
of the blood supply); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
67, 74 (1992) ("The social product is diminished if persons are able to exact compensation
from truthful critics of their failings, for such a right reduces the incentive to produce
truth.").
99 On the income or "welfare" effects, see E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on
Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 18-19 (1971) (''The
maximum sum [a person] will pay for something valuable is obviously related to, indeed
limited by, a person's total resources, while the minimum sum he will accept for parting
with it is subject to no such constrain."). Thus, "owning" a right increase one's valuation of
it because the ownership itself is a source of value. See WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 209-12 (2007) (using the term
"wealth effects"). In addition, as a psychological matter, people tend to put a higher value
on a thing they own than they would spend to purchase the same item. This is the related
but distinct notion of "endowment effect." See id. at 212.
100 On income effect and antidissemination motives, see Gordon, Excuse and
Justification, supra note 22, at 179-83, 189-91 (discussing pricelessness and systemic
effects); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042-46 (examining the
"economics of suppression" under the rubric of '"income' or 'wealth' effects"). See also
96
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Ordinarily, economic analysts determine which use of a resource is most
socially valuable by asking "what would be the outcome of a market transaction
between different potential users." The person willing to pay the most is assumed
to value the resource most highly. For goods affected by the income effect and
similar phenomena, however, the market would reveal different results depending
on the identity of the party to which the law awarded initial ownership of the good.
As a result, a market transaction could not reveal with any stability which use of
the good (the critic's use to criticize, or the criticized person's use to protect
himself) would generate more value.
Thus economic analysis joins free speech concerns in showing why a right to
copy fairly lengthy excerpts for purposes of criticism is well established. As the
Second Circuit has recognized, 102 and common sense suggests, even if a copyright
claimant was willing to license critical uses at some price, that would not wipe out
fair use for criticism.
We could go on surveying the existing literature and case law. Instead, let us
tum to two factors that have been implicitly taken into account by some courts and
commentators, but need explicit recognition. The first category is the need to
maintain privacy, which cannot be easily accommodated in individual deals
between copyright claimant and utilizer. The second category is the need to keep
rights packaged in a way that keeps information costs within tolerable levels. 103
Each category involves harms both to the potential utilizer, and to persons outside
the immediate parties to the potential transaction.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1632-35 (discussing
antidissemination motives); Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 359; Robert P. Merges, Are
You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21
AIPLA Q.J. 305, 309-10 (1993); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair
Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 81-84 (1991).
101 One might call the latter a ''pricelessness effect." See Gordon, Excuse and
Justification, supra note 22, at 182. Admittedly, some might characterize the lastmentioned argument as a kind of market barrier between copyright claimant and utilizer
because if one party views control over the use as ''priceless," there will be no exchange.
But we use pricelessness as an example simply because it is so dramatic. Income and
endowment effects have a wide range of impacts on the licenses that are (and are not)
reached. Thus, income and endowment effects can apply even when an author is willing to
sell the right to quote him critically at some price; what is crucial to these effects (and to
the way they skew resource use) is simply that for some things, the price one is willing to
pay is different from the price the same person would be willing to accept if he were the
owner.
102 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir.
2006) ("[A] copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely
'by developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other
transformative uses of its own creative work."' quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol
Publ'fc Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998))).
03 We are indebted here to Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
26 (2000).
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V. Two MORE BASES FOR FAIR USE

A. Preserving Expectations of Privacy 104

The ability to meter uses of copyrighted works finely comes at a cost to the
privacy of the utilizer. 105 When a window opens on Janine's computer offering her
a license to download, her initial thought process would probably be something
like this: Who is asking for my credit card number? Is this message from who it
claims to be from, or is somebody trying to steal my identity? If she is satisfied
that the message is genuine and its sender is trustworthy, she still might not want
to share information about how she is planning to use the copyrighted material.
The purchase of such a license will leave a personally identifiable record of her

' 04

We are not the first to notice that privacy has potential relevance for fair use. For
example, a brief but stimulating discussion appears in Africa, supra note 2, at 1171, 1176.
See also, e.g., Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25. Privacy issues have been
prominent in discussions of management technologies, see, for example, Cohen, supra note
25, at 1012; Electronic Privacy Information Center, Digital Rights Management and
Privacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2007) (expressing
concerns about various DRM technologies, including some that "phone home" to a central
server), and in discussions of peer-to-peer networks. The Supreme Court may have had
privacy concerns in mind when it gave fair use treatment to consumers who made copies
for purposes of time-shifting their viewing of television shows at home. Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1990). Our aims are to
emphasize this strand of analysis in a way that will (a) show how transactions between
willing parties can impose privacy costs on third parties, and (b) put user privacy more
explicitly on the fair use agenda.
Just as Brandeis and Warren suggested that privacy concerns play a legitimate role in
common law copyright's grant of exclusion rights, we suggest that privacy can play a
legitimate role in copyright's grant of public rights. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 205 (1890). For the point about
Warren and Brandeis, we are indebted to Pamela Samuelson.
105 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 1012 ("The freedom to read anonymously is just as
much a part of our tradition, and the choice of reading materials just as expressive of
identity, as the decision to use or withhold one's name. Indeed, based purely on tradition,
the freedom to read anonymously may be even more fundamental than the freedom to
engage in anonymous political speech."). On the value of privacy especially in the Internet
context, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright's Public Private Distinction, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 963, 963 (2005); Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright
Trump Privacy?, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 376 (2003); Sonia K. Katyal,
Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 223 (2004-2005); Jacqueline Lipton,
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 137-38 (2004);
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1287
(2000); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED Jan. 1996, at 135.
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desired use. Beyond the usual concerns about embarrassment, persecution, 106 or
undesired, targeted advertising, Janine might worry that such a license
compromises any desire she has for secrecy in her work. She may not want other
researchers to know what she is working on until she is able to publish it lest they
preempt her work. If Janine decides to buy the derivative work license, she has
functionally allowed the translations' copyright owners the ability to look quite
closely at her current work. This secrecy concern might be heightened if she were
a researcher racing for a patent, or a corporate CEO who did not want somebody to
know that he had been reading a book with a title like Defending Against Hostile
Takeovers for Dummies (or worse, that he had read the book three times and
printed "Chapter 7: They'll Never Guess You're Bluffing!"). 107
Consider the way that libraries refuse to give out their readers' lists of
borrowing, lest borrowing be chilled. 108 Similarly, sometimes an uncompensated
Fortunately for Janine, researching Aristotle is not likely to get her on a no-fly list
of any sort. However, her colleague doing research on the tactics of the Weather
Undergound or the IRA might not be so fortunate.
1 7 We should consider, briefly, whether Janine, the patent researcher, or the CEO
might be able to take steps to increase anonymity. It is possible to imagine an intermediary
protecting privacy just as Paypal might protect credit card numbers. To a certain extent this
might work, provided people had the technical savvy to use it and were readily able to find
a trusted intermediary. Still, the intermediary might be vulnerable to subpoenas, and we
doubt that the necessary technology exists to guarantee full anonymity against
sophisticated hacking. Moreover, Paypal and anonymity would hardly work where
permission is sought to make derivative works. In such cases, copyright owners typically
want to know the user's plans for the work.
Mathew Africa makes a similar point in assessing the danger that "records of which
articles a company was photocopying might be used by the company's competitors .... to
deduce valuable trade secrets." Africa, supra note 2, at 1171. He suggests that even though
the Copyright Clearance Center had made efforts to "mask" the names of copied articles,
"a competitor might still be able to infer this information through careful study of [CCC]
records." Id. at 1171 n.115.
108 Forty-eight states currently have confidentiality laws relating to library records.
American Library Association, State Privacy Laws Regarding Library Records (2007),
http://www.ala.org/template.cfm?section=stateifcinaction7template=/contentmanagement/
contentdisplay.cfm&contentID=14773 (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). According to such
laws, library records are to remain confidential and not to be disclosed except in very
specific situations, including pursuant to an order or subpoena, see, for example, CAL.
Gov'TCODE § 6267 (West 1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4509 (McKinney 2007), or when required
to protect public safety, see, for example, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.124 (Vernon
1995). See also American Library Association, Code of Ethics, art. ill (1995), http://
www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/codeofethics/codeofethics.pdf (stating the American
Library Association's policy to protect each library user's right to privacy and
confidentiality with respect to circulation records, as a matter of professional ethics);
American library Association, Policy on Confidentiality of Library Records (1986),
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/otherpolicies/confidentialitylibraryrecords.pdf
(stating that such records are not to be made available except pursuant to an order or
subpoena). We are indebted to the B.U. Law Library staff for this footnote.
106
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use of copyrighted works should be deemed fair to safeguard the privacy interests
of someone who does not want to leave the kind of identifying tracks that a license
requires. It is true that Janine probably left a record with her purchase of the digital
books. However, the supplemental license would require her to leave a record of
the manner in which she is using them as well as possibly the nature of her
underlying work. If she has a fair use liberty, she is freed of the need to disclose
details she would prefer to keep private.
Many market transactions come with privacy concerns. One might therefore
object that privacy concerns cannot motivate fair use since privacy issues arise in
all market transactions. Why would society worry about the market for intellectual
transactions when society accepts the need to reveal private facts when people
purchase things like contraceptives, pharmaceuticals, and life insurance? Point of
purchase embarrassment may be a sort of transaction cost-but it is rarely a deal
breaker.
This objection has many replies. Most obviously, the tangible world also has
legal protections for privacy. For example, insurance and prescription
pharmaceuticals are subject to privacy policies and regulations. 109 But in addition,
the literature on free speech is full of reasons why markets in communication may
stand in special need of the law's solicitude. Most notably, communication gives
benefits to many people beyond the immediate speaker and recipient, yet the desire
to communicate is more easily chilled than are other, more robust, material
wants. 110 In addition, intellectual products are nonrivalrous, so when extra,
uncompensated copies are made there may be no harm to revenue; moreover,
markets for intangibles may impose more dead weight loss than necessary to
generate incentives. 111
The narrowly tailored license could allow undesirable insight into the
personal as well as the professional life of the potential purchaser. Traditionally, a
book could be bought as a gift, as a coffee table decoration, to complete a
collection, because the purchaser is friends with the author, or even because the
purchaser liked the cover art. However, a license to read, reread, or copy could
imply a stronger interest in the underlying subject matter. It might also reveal the
time and location the material is being read.
If that subject matter is "how to leave my job" or "how to get over my
neurosis," those whom it would most benefit might be unwilling to leave a record
of their need. To put it mildly, such reading is not something society wants to chill.

And offline anonymity can often be preserved through using cash.
We might imagine certain documents such as the Pentagon Papers that are
protected by the First Amendment but where potential readers are worried that if they are
traced as receiving and circulating the documents to others, they will end up on a
government watch list.
111 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1032 (1999) ("[T]he profits coming from the last
increment of monopoly pricing impose disproportionate costs on society.").
109

110
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We should also highlight that our immediate concern is the expectation of
privacy as well as privacy in a particular instance. A reader might have a purely
academic interest in the "how to get over my neurosis" book and, having nothing
to hide, view the privacy cost only as a minor addition to a standard transaction
cost. However, if this reader purchases a license it will shift the cost of maintaining
privacy to the next reader, who in this case, may have the more socially valuable
use. If privacy becomes something only maintained by those with something to
hide, then an assertion of privacy becomes an admission of guilt.
We worry about identity theft. We worry about embarrassment. But we worry
most about the commodification of the most intimate, the most personal parts of
our lives. Requiring a license for particularly private or personal intellectual
exchanges raises larger privacy concerns. 112 We use intellectual products both to
understand ourselves and to understand our relationships with each other. Should
the lover acquire a license before copying down a few particularly resonant lines of
poetry in a letter? Must the children playing Superman acquire a license for a
public performance of a derivative work? May the text of a wedding
announcement or an obituary be copied into an email or scanned into the family
computer? Because our lives are so seeped in intellectual products and ideas,
requiring a license for all uses would raise privacy concerns unprecedented in other
market situations.
Privacy is a particularly pressing concern in artistic matters. Just as privacy
may involve shielding one's actions from the eyes of others, it can also involve
creating a personal space free from external influences. In the hypothetical
involving Bob Dylan's creative process, and the early stages of his burgeoning
creativity as a songwriter, a demand for a licensing fee could be particularly
intrusive. For young Bob Dylan, paying a licensing fee to copy down a song would
invite a licensing agency into his intensely personal struggle to define and
understand himself as an artist. Nothing kills a dream like boilerplate. 113
Finally, our privacy concern also extends beyond worries about specific
transactions. By its nature, privacy must be protected at a societal rather than
individual level. While Janine may not be at all concerned about her privacy, if she
sacrifices it, she increases the cost to the next researcher who desires to preserve
privacy. If privacy is readily commoditized, those who value their own privacy
will be assumed to be hiding something. We suggest that privacy concerns might
help to justify a finding of fair use, both to prevent the chilling of the use by
privacy-valuing individuals and to protect an individual's right to seek privacy
without stigma.

112

Indeed, as we suggested above, one of the reasons society is willing to tolerate a
loss of privacy in some market transactions is that many tangible goods have multiple
possible uses. Nobody needs to know whether a purchaser of roses intends them as a
centerpiece or as a gift to an illicit lover. With increased use of DRM technology and
increasingly specific licenses, this anonymity is shrinking for intellectual products.
113 Of his first contract, Dylan says he signed it without reading it. DYLAN, supra note
70, at 280.
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A liberty that needs to be bargained for may end up being used far differently
than a liberty that is freely granted. A liberty that is freely granted as a favor may
end up being used far differently than a liberty that is freely granted as an
entitlement. And a liberty whose use is monitored may be a liberty that goes
unused.
B. Packaging: Preventing Slivers of Rights from Pricking
Just as courts should take into account the privacy costs of denying fair use to
a defendant, they should take ·into account the benefits of granting fair use to "trim
away" undesirable restraints from awkwardly shaped packaging. One such set of
benefits relates to standardization. 114
We address this in two contexts. First, we raise the possibility that courts
should be more willing than they now are to use preemption to strike down those
purported contractual restraints that violate congressional intent as found in the fair
use provision. 115 We raise that possibility only in a preliminary way, given the
importance of the countervailing issues, 116 but the preemption possibility needs at
least to be mentioned in any discussion of standardization and fair use. We discuss
preemption in regard to Janine, who may have (for example) assented to a contract
that forbade multiple rereadings.
Second, and with more certainty, we address the standardization issue in the
context of unusual or unexpected assertions of copyright. Fair use can be used to
help honor consumer expectations 117 and prevent one unusual copyright owner
from spoiling the profits of the group. We discuss this in the context of Bob
Dylan's hand-copying the lyrics and music from ''Pirate Jenny."
The growth of digital commerce has allowed intellectual products to be sold
in previously unknown packaging. A copyright owner could, without too much
trouble, sell a song that would only play on the sound system of a Cadillac driving

114

As mentioned above, this section is indebted to the work of Merrill & Smith, supra
note 103.
115 See supra note 30.
116 Merrill and Smith note that the costs of standardization in property-rights forms
might be kept low by preserving the possibility of some workarounds. See Merrill & Smith,
supra note 103, at 35 (noting, for example, that numerus clausus problems can sometimes
be avoided by carefully rewriting leases). Our suggestion could limit the ability to do
contractual workarounds. Nevertheless, the benefits of standardization need to be
acknowledged, even if in the contract context the countervailing costs are also high.
117 Customary uses have long been favored by fair use. For example, Africa suggests
that one consideration the courts should take into account is, "Will [requiring a market]
defeat the expectations of the public?" Africa, supra note 2, at 1176. But it is important to
identify the dangers in relying on custom, see Gordon, supra note 4, and to be clear about
what its potential benefits might be. What the instant Article adds to the discussion is a
focus on the Merrill and Smith factors, in particular, the way that noncustomary packages,
though perhaps agreed upon by the immediate parties to a transaction, can impose
increased search and measurement costs on third parties.

2007]

AMENDING SECTION

107

649

between 75 and 85 mph on a Monday. With a bit more effort, the owner might find
somebody who would actually buy this bundle. 118 However, whatever benefit
arises from such a transaction would be dwarfed by the headache to everyone else
who now has to be careful not to accidentally purchase the Monday-SpeedingCadillac bundle. While many bundles are possible, not all bundles are equally
valuable, and the more bundles there are, the greater the search cost to people who
want to buy a specific bundle. 119 Through fair use, a court can shape these bundles
into more standard, readily recognizable forms. A court might determine that a
sliver of a right, such as a right to reread or time-shift, should be sold with a copy
of the work. This could curb the proliferation of nonstandard packages that, in
addition to leading to unpleasant consumer surprise, can actually decrease the
value of all intellectual products. 120 Again, note that our primary concern is with
118

Further, with some clever programming, he could ensure that the purchaser only
listens to the song in the prescribed manner. While such strange arrangements were
possible before the digital age, DRM has made such strangely tailored packages selfenforcing.
"DRM" originated as an acronym for "Digital Rights Management," although as
Richard Stallman has pointed out, "Digital Restrictions Management" might be a more apt
referent. RICHARD STALLMAN, Can You Trust Your Computer?, in FREE SOFIWARE, FREE
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 117' 117 (Joshua Gay ed., 2nd ed.
2004), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf.
DRM refers to technological restrictions placed on computer media, typically to
prevent unlicensed use of music. The goal is to manage consumers' use of digital media by
restricting their actions to a subset of behaviors. Typically, computer code tells users'
computers what the user is allowed to do. This usually means that behaviors the
programmer expects and approves of will work fairly well, but that behaviors the
programmer wishes to discourage, or which are simply less conventional and thus
overlooked by the DRM architects, will be inhibited. Among other things, DRM may make
it difficult for users to switch from one type of media player to another, or to change
computers without losing the functionality of their files.
The DMCA provides legal back-up to DRM. See supra note 35 (discussing the
DMCA).
119 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 103, at 24-40.
120 Slicing rights thinly can be lucrative, but also destructive-not only to the
copyright claimant and the potential utilizer but also to other copyright owners and
potential users. Let us illustrate with an example from the physical world. A simple form of
this example is suggested by Merrill & Smith's discussion on currency, weights, and
measures. Merrill & Smith, supra note 103, at 48.
When coins were made of uniform weights of gold, profit could be made by shaving a
few grams of gold from one's coins, and selling the harvested gold separately. This practice
was highly discouraged, both by custom and law. Yet if I own a piece of gold jewelry,
property law suggests that I can melt it down and divide it into two pieces of jewelry if I
wish. Why shouldn't I also be able to shave off a bit of my gold coin and put the coin back
into circulation? After all, it is my gold.
The answer is easy to see. We all know the problems that would arrive when I dump
my diminished coin into the market. Let's say a coin that formerly weighed thirty grams
now weighs twenty-four. If I shave this much off a coin, an astute purchaser will likely
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harm to qther market partici~ants outside the transaction who will be inflicted with
increased uncertainty costs. 1 1
Let us return to Janine and Bob Dylan. If Janine, in acquiring her digital
books, entered into a contract that prohibits rereading one of her books, she and
anybody she tells about her license now have doubts about whether other
electronic books are rereadable. She will have to check more carefully in the future
to ensure that the she is purchasing what she thinks she is purchasing.
Additionally, if she ever hopes to resell any of her digital books in some form, any
prospective purchaser will need to find a way to ensure that she actually possesses
the rights she thinks she does. 122 To avoid these problems, a court should consider
using preemption to enforce fair use against those portions of Janine's contract that
create the troublesome slivers of rights.
Bob Dylan's example presents an analogous problem. Many commentators
have noted that consumers being able to engage in multiple uses or in sharing can
increase the value (and price) of copyright licenses. 123 If Bob Dylan and other fans
think they must ensure that they have explicit permissions before they can handcopy a song's lyrics, the value they will see in buying songs will decrease-as will
the price they will be willing to pay. Thus, if most holders of music copyrights
would freely allow lyric transcribing, a few spoilers could create uncertainty that
decreases the value of everybody's copyright.

notice something isn't right. Let's assume I even tell my purchaser-perhaps in very fine
print-that I have shaved off part of the coin. The savvy purchaser should notice this and
appropriately discount the value of my coin. The transaction is arguably fair, depending on
our mutual expectations and the size of the fine print. But let's assume it's fair at least
between myself and my savvy purchaser.
I nevertheless have created some harm to others by shaving off my coin. I have
devalued the worth of currency as an institution. Now every future merchant will need to
weigh carefully every coin. Imagine the downstream chaos we would create if we gave
change for a $20 bill by cutting off a proportion equivalent to $3.17 !
Even if I never receive any improper benefit from my coin modification, I have
imposed costs on everyone. Now everyone has to buy a scale that's sensitive to minute
variations in weight. If they don't buy scales, they will instead discount the value of all
coins to reflect the possibility they've been shaved. The value of a coin in the marketplace
is thereby diminished.
121 In addition, of course, there can be harm to the participants themselves, but
conceivably they can take care of the difficulties by explicit license terms. Third parties are
not so easily protected. This is, of course, one of our usual themes: the possibility of some
market between some of the affected parties does not safeguard all the people affected.
122 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 373 (2002) (recognizing numerus clausus in property law, but suggesting its root
cause is allowing potential purchasers to verify what rights the seller possesses).
123 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 25, at 46-48; Michael J. Meurer, Price
Discrimination, Personal Use and Privacy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 845, 858 (1997).

2007]

AMENDING SECTION 107

651

Fair use can also create consistency between old and new media. What rights
come with a digital book? A court might approach this question by analogy. What
is a digital book? It is like a book, but electronic. If a court sought to honor
consumer expectations by giving a digital book a similar set of rights to those of a
physical book-modified primarily by the necessities of electronic form- fair use
would be one of the applicable tools for the court to apply .124
In some cases, such as transferability, the peculiarities of the electronic form
may suggest a slightly different default package. 125 But we suspect that the burden
for shifting from a recognized form to a new form should fall on the party claiming
that a use is unfair.
VI. TowARD A THEORY OF PUBLIC RIGHTS

A. The Need for a Theory of Public Rights
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the public has "a federal right to
'copy and to use'" 126 what the patent and copyright laws do not make exclusive. 127
That is, the Court has treated areas where the legislature has refused to grant
exclusivity as constituting an affirmative grant to the public of the corresponding
liberty right, and has given that right to "copy and use" a weight sufficiently heavy
that it invalidates or narrows state 128 and federal 129 claims that might interfere with
it. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court restricted the potential scope of the
Lanham Act (the federal trademark statute) to keep it from eroding the public's
right to copy ·and use works of expression whose copyright had expired. 130

124 As Jessica Litman has emphasized, consumers don't read and understand
copyright statutes. Litman, supra note 25, at 51-52.
125 There may be digital packages (for example, allowing primitive copying sans page
numbers and formatting, but disallowing exact PDF printing) that maximize value for both
producers and consumer. See Gal Oestreicher-Singer & Arnn Sundararajan, Are Digital
Rights Valuable? Theory and Evidence from eBook Pricing, 2004 TWENTY-FIFTH INT'L
CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 533.
126 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
127 When the concept was born, the Court extended the treatment to copyright as well
as patent. Thus, the Court wrote: "To forbid copying would interfere with the federal
policy, found in Art. I, s. 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964) (dicta). To similar effect is Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 23133 (1964) (asserting that states may not per se prohibit the copying of articles unprotected
by copyright or patent) (dicta). It was not until 2003 that the Court put teeth in the
copyright half. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003).
128 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165 (preempting a state law that prohibited a form of
copyin~ boat hull designs).
12 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33-37
130 Id.
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These rights to copy are nowhere articulated as such in the patent or copyright
law. Rather, they arise naturally where the domains of patent and copyright
exclusivity end, 131 and are given strength by policy. 132 We suggest that fair use,
which is articulated explicitly by statute, which has a long judicial tradition, and
which has constitutional stature, be given similar recognition. 133 Further, as one of
us has argued, the very "natural law" rights that are usually cited as providing the
moral premise for an author's claim to reward also provide the premise for a strong
set of expressive rights in the public. 134
We need a comprehensive definition of the public's rights in the realm of
expression. 135 Ray Patterson, 136 Julie Cohen, and others have seen this as a need to

131

All duties have correlative claim rights; all areas of no-duty are realms of liberties.
See the discussion of Hohfeld, supra note 26.
132 Whether a federal liberty is strong enough to withstand a newly made state statute
or a newly asserted cause of action is a matter not of Hohfeldian definition but of policy.
That a strong entitlement to copy does not arise from the mere fact of federal nonprotection
is demonstrated by Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974). In that
case the Court allowed states to prohibit some copying of secret but unpatented inventions.
Id. at 491-93. If an invincible "right to copy" had followed from the mere fact that the
inventions were unprotected by federal patent law, Kewanee would have gone the other
way and preempted state trade secrecy law. The Court allowed trade secrecy law to stand
because of a policy judgment: the states allowed copying by reverse engineering and the
Court viewed this factor, among others, as sufficing to keep trade secrecy laws from
significantly interfering with patent policy. Id. By contrast, a law that prohibited copying of
publicly known inventions would interfere with patent policy, as Bonito Boats made clear.
489 U.S. at 162.
Our argument is, of course, that fair use is not merely an existing liberty, but is also a
liberty that serves a strong policy: fair use is essential to preserving the balance that makes
assertion of private ownership over speech acceptable. Without fair use, copyright would
not only be constitutionally questionable, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20
(2003), and violate notions of justice, see Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, but also
could impair the public's economic welfare, see, e.g., COMPUTER & COMMC'NS INDUS.
Assoc., FAIR USE IN THE NEW ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES
RELYING ON FAIR USE 6 (2007), available at http://www.ccianet.org/art
manager/uploads/l/FairUseStudy-Sep12.pdf (providing "an initial assessment of the
economic contribution generated by companies benefiting from fair use").
133 The U.S. courts are beginning to recognize this. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc.
v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (referring to "the rights that
the CoRyright Act grants to the public").
1 4 Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 1536-37, 1555-72 (regarding the
public's entitlement), 1577-78, 1592-96, 1601-09 (applying Lockean theory to provide a
basis for fair use); see also Drassinower, supra note 38; Abraham Drassinower, A RightsBased View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3
(2003).
135 See Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25, at 372.
136 See L. RAY PATIERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAWOFUSERS' RIGHTS 191 (1991).
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focus on the "users" of copyrighted works. 137 Th,at is a salutary starting place,
particularly if one recognizes that authors too are users, 138 but the notion of "user"
has implications that are too narrow. The public has rights in many capacities, not
just as utilizers. For example, they may have rights as cocreators of the
copyrighted work, 139 as harmed parties seeking redress through self help, 140 as
holders of First Amendment free speech rights, 141 and as human beings. 142
See Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25, at 348; Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004).
138 Cf Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 966 (1990) (asserting
that no authorship exists without debt to predecessors).
139 See generally LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007)
(arguing that the public is also an author); Daniel Bahls, The Fluid Text and Its Authors
(May 20, 2007) (unpublished paper, on file with authors) (arguing that the public's
authorial role continues through criticism, translation, and interpretation even after a work
is first published).
140 The best example is that of Jerry Falwell who, as part of a fundraising effort, sent
his supporters copies of a copyrighted ''fake ad" published by Hustler magazine that had
depicted Falwell in a degrading light. The Ninth Circuit wrote:
137

[A]n individual in rebutting a .copyrighted work containing derogatory
information about himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to
permit understandable comment. Falwell did not use more than was reasonably
necessary to make an understandable comment when he copied the entire parody
from the magazine.... [T]he public interest in allowing an individual to defend
himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption
of unfairness.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986). From
a Lockean perspective, the right to replicate another's expression in self-defense can be
linked to the public's rights in the common. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at
1565-72, 1601-05.
The First Amendment sharply limits the rights the government can give to private
parties to obtain monetary redress for the harms done them by speech. Thus, in a
companion case, Falwell was denied the right to sue Hustler for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988). But fair
use and cognate doctrines-such as estoppel--only give liberties as redress: the ability to
use speech as a form of self-help to fight back against the injurer. See Gordon, Caesar,
supra note 41, at 83 n.30 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 45, at 897-898; Netanel, supra note 45, at 348
("[D]issemination of fixed original expression ... is a fundamental building block of
democratic association."); Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 3-12.
142 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 A (III), at art.
27(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right freely to participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement
and its benefits."). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.
15.l(a)-(b), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm ("The States Parties to the present Covenant

654

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 3

The current statute could be organized around the public's many liberty
rights, but instead is organized in the opposite way: around a copyright owner's
exclusion rights. That is, the statute could state all the things the public can do as
the first order of business, and only as a second order of business identify
exclusive right holders who have the power to unlock the gates to the things the
public cannot do.
The two forms of organization are analytically identical. In the graphic arts,
foreground and background are drawn by the same stroke of the pencil. One can
map an archipelago by focusing on the ocean and drawing where it ends, or by
focusing on the islands and showing where they end. But unlike graphic art, words
cannot simultaneously draw background and foreground. Something must take
precedence in order for anything to be stated.
The specification of a copyright owner's claim rights was placed at the center
of the statute. This may have made sense as a matter of initial drafting strategy:
Because the liberty to copy is assumed to be the background condition, 143 it is
simplest to assume the sea of liberty, and spend one's words on specifying the few
islands. That is the way most of us perceive law: as the exception, the places where
we have duties instead of liberty. 144 But now that the copyright statute is
immensely complex, the public, as the party least able to afford lawyers, should
have a simple statement of what members of the public are entitled to. 145

recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications").
Some philosophers distinguish between rights we hold because of what we do (special
rights), and rights we hold because of our status as humans (general rights). JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRlvATE PROPERTY 106-24 (1988). Some fair use is premised
on special rights, and some on general.
143 Copyright and patent are seen as islands of protection in a sea of liberty. Whether
the background really is a sea of liberty, however, is open to debate. See, e.g., J.H.
Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a
Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
475, 516--17 (1995) ("If, as the old cliche declares, the classical patent and copyright
systems were once islands of protection in a sea of competition, the legal hybrids-taken
together--conjure up the vision of a sea of protection in which intrepid entrepreneurs
encounter remote islands of free competition.").
144 This understanding is culturally based. An old joke goes this way: In the US,
everything is allowed except if forbidden. In Germany, everything is forbidden except if
allowed. In the USSR, everything is compulsory except if forbidden.
145 See Litman, supra note 138, at 970-77 (discussing the complexity of the copyright
statute). Jeremy Bentham apparently had a similar notion for legislation. In inquiring
"whether the law should be expounded at length in a list of rights or a list of obligations,"
Hart notes, "The test which [Bentham] proposed was 'Present the entire law to that one of
the parties that has most need to be instructed."' H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 171, 190 (A.W.B. Simpson ed.,
1973) (citation omitted).
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B. Some Possible Rights of the Public

What would be one such first order right? As Litman and Stallman have
suggested, one such right should be "the right to read." 146 Our gorge rises at the
thought that we would have to account to someone else for our reading, or allow
someone else to track what we read by forcing us to sign up for it. Because of
technological changes, and some doubtful judicial precedent, browsing online is
probably considered making a reproduction. 147 As noted above, this act of private
copying may trigger a prima facie duty to get permission first.
If the statute were written with ordinary expectations about public rights made
explicit, it would say something like: "no permissions needed for private reading."
But such a sentence was omitted because no one would have imagined that such a
statement would be necessary. However, technology changed, and the act of
reading became something that might involve reproduction. So to guard against
technology making further inadvertent incursions on public rights, the public's
rights need to be made explicit. Fair use is a good place to start.
For now, therefore, we make a modest suggestion: The statute should make it
explicit that fair use is a "right." The Supreme Court of Canada has done no less, in
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 148 As that Court writes:
[T]he fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an
integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling
within the fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of
copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the
Copyright Act, is a user's right. In order to maintain the proper ·balance
between the rights of a copyright owner and user's interest, it must not be
interpreted restrictively. As Professor Vaver ... has explained ... : "User
rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should
therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial
legislation. 149
It is overdue for our courts to do the same. 150
See Litman, supra note 25, at 31-34; Stallman, supra note 25, at 75-78.
This is the unfortunate legacy of a case with a different focus. MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991F.2d511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra note 78.
148 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC
13 (Can.), at 1 48, available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2004/2004scc13/2004
scc13.html (emphasis deleted). For a stimulating discussion of this issue, see Abraham
Drassinower, supra note 38 and Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN
THE PUBLIC INIBREST: THE FuruRE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAw 462 (Michael Geist
ed., 2005).
149 CCH Canadian, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, at <J[ 48. (quoting DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT
LAW 171 (2000)); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 137, at 26 (asserting that focus on
intellectual property rights favors proprietary concerns).
150 They can and should do so without a statute, but a legislative nudge rarely hurts.
146
147
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That fair use deserves to be seen a "right"-in the sense of an entitlement
with a guarantee of continuity and sighificant importance-should be even clearer
in the United States context. Not only has our Supreme Court declared that fair use
has Constitutional backing, 151 but in addition fair use has played a key role in the
development of United States copyright doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION

We would revise the current§ 107152 to read as follows, with italics indicating
areas of change:
§ 107. The right of fair use
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means [words omitted here], for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is a right and not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include( 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
151

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (fair use is one of the Copyright
Act's "traditional First Amendment safeguards.").
152 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) now reads:
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to

the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished or that a license is available for
the contested use shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all relevant factors.
Our proposed modifications to copyright law would clarify that uses such as
Janine's and Bob Dylan's would remain fair use even if a publisher offers to
explicitly license them.
As for the location of the change, it is logical to place it where Congress
corrected the courts the last time they tried to artificially constrain fair use, namely,
in the final sentence of § 107. In that sentence, Congress made clear that no one
factor-there, the unpublished status of plaintiffs work-should be determinative. 153
We suggest a similar addition for the availability of licensing. 154
As mentioned, we adopt this agenda in part because some courts and
commentators apparently believe that a§ 107 fair use claim should be denied if a
licensing market for that use exists. This ambiguity, combined with a largely onesided interaction between savvy right owners and risk-averse, downstream
producers, 155 has threatened to shrink fair use. The fair use provision of the
copyright statute, however, is critical to copyright's ability to serve the social
interest.
We also suggest that § 107 drop its potentially restraining first clause, 156 and
that it identify fair use as a right. These changes would further underline the
importance of fair use, by making clear that it can play a role in cases involving the
DMCA, that fair use is a crucial part of any conflicts analysis under preemption,
and that the burden of proving all elements of fair use need not rest on the
defendant. As the Supreme Court has said of the public's ability to copy
unpatented inventions, the public's ability to "copy and to use" is a "right"157 that
Id. ("The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.")
154 We also changed the last two words of the existing sentence, to make clear that the
four factors listed in the statute are not the only ones that matter. Decades of jurisprudence
and legislative history have consistently indicated, that the four factors listed in § 107 are
merely illustrative. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors to "include" in consideration of fair
use); see also id. § 101 (indicating that, "[t]he terms 'including' and 'such as' are
illustrative and not limitative."). See H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555 (acknowledging that list in §107 is illustrative).
155 See generally Africa, supra note 2, at 1172 (arguing that fear of liability warps fair
use); Gibson, supra note 4, at 887 (stating four core uncontroversial premises).
156 Deleting the first clause, "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A," is directed at DMCA concerns. See supra notes 35, 83.
157 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1989); see
also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-37 (2003) (giving
153
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cannot be lightly abandoned. Our Congress should explicitly declare that fair use
deserves similar respect.

federal trademark law a restrictive interpretation in order to avoid trademark claims being
used in a way that would erode the public's right to copy works whose copyright has
expired). See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.

